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ABSTRACT 
Personal memory is an influential factor in constructing self-identity. The 
way one views themselves based on past events significantly affects mental 
processes in the present, impacting not only wellbeing but also attitudes and 
opinions that guide future behaviour. It is therefore hugely important to 
understand the mechanisms by which mental disorders influence everyday 
memory functioning. Depression and visual perspective (observer and own-
eyes) of mental imagery are both associated with varying levels of cognitive 
processing and action identification, which has been a target for therapeutic 
treatment in the past. This study therefore aimed to investigate the 
relationships between action identification, depression, and visual 
perspective of autobiographical memory. 116 participants reported 
spontaneous visual perspective ratings for 10 specific memories, 4 of which 
were subsequently shifted to the opposite perspective and rated again. 
Standardised questionnaires were distributed to measure action 
identification and depression. Correlation and mediation analyses were 
conducted, yielding no significant results. The findings are discussed in 
terms of the confounding variables that may have opposed the predicted 
effects and therefore need to be controlled for in future research within this 
field.  
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Autobiographical memory is arguably one of the most important contributors involved 
in defining the self. The dependence of identity on personal memory is highlighted in 
numerous cases involving memory impairment. From head-injury patients losing both 
episodic memory and their sense of self simultaneously (Schacter, 2008), to 
Alzheimer’s patients showing a decline in the strength and quality of identity with 
disease progression (Rose Addis & Tippet, 2004), it is clear that autobiographical 
memory plays a fundamental role in how individuals view themselves. Interestingly, it 
is not only the content of autobiographical memory that influences identity processes, 
but how the past event is remembered in the present (Wilson & Ross, 2003). Memory 
retrieval mechanisms can result in a number of alterations in the way a past event is 
perceived in the present, such as changes to the subjective temporal distance of the 
event (Ross & Wilson, 2002), the intensity of emotions associated with the event 
(Schaefer & Philippot, 2005), and the visual perspective adopted during recall (Nigro 
& Neisser, 1983). Pointedly, these alterations guide and regulate emotions towards 
particular life events with the aim to enhance wellbeing (Bluck, 2003) and promote a 
coherent, stable identity over time (Conway, 1996). This, in turn, provides attitudes 
and opinions that guide future behaviour (Cohen & Conway, 2007). It is therefore 
hugely important to understand the variations in autobiographical memory retrieval 
that can result in changes to current self-identity and subsequent behaviour, paying 
particular attention to the possible underlying mechanisms responsible for impaired 
wellbeing.    
The present study focuses primarily on visual perspective during retrieval, specifically, 
whether events are remembered from first or third person perspectives. Nigro and 
Neisser (1983) first distinguished the phenomenological characteristics of memory 
retrieval into two perspective categories. First person perspective, otherwise referred 
to as ‘field’ or ‘own-eyes’ perspectives, denotes those memories seen in the mind’s 
eye as it was originally experienced. On the other hand, third person (or ‘observer’) 
perspective involves recalling the event from the viewpoint of an observer, where one 
can see themselves in the memory. Numerous studies have since confirmed not only 
Nigro and Neisser’s (1983) original proposal that certain properties of events at 
encoding determine the perspective at retrieval, but also that each perspective 
influences the subjective experience and the information recalled during retrieval. 
Regarding the latter phenomena, own-eyes perspectives have been found to evoke 
more emotional reliving (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), vividness of mental imagery 
(Robinson & Swanson, 1993), and details of both psychological state and physical 
sensations (McIsaac & Eich, 2002) in comparison to observer perspectives. 
Additionally, observer perspectives have been found to maximise integration of 
contextual information during retrieval (Valenti & MacGregor, 2011, cited in Libby & 
Eibach, 2011), allowing individuals access to information beyond that of the 
remembered episode. Furthermore, these findings have also been reinforced by 
neuroimaging studies, whereby activity in brain areas associated with interoceptive 
awareness is reduced when an observer, as opposed to own-eyes, perspective is 
employed at retrieval (Eich, Nelson, Leghari, & Handy, 2009), and thus provides a 
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possible neuronal mechanism by which observer perspectives dampen emotional 
reliving.     
The idea of an association between observer perspectives and a broader context can 
be explained as a reflection of higher levels of processing. Libby, Shaeffer, and Eibach 
(2009) first proposed that perspective is used as a representational tool whereby the 
level of meaning inferred from a memory is bi-directionally related to the perspective 
applied at retrieval. Own-eyes perspective represents a bottom-up approach to 
understanding the meaning of a remembered event, with a focus on concrete features 
such as the internal psychological state and physical sensations at the time of 
encoding, hence focusing on how the action was carried out. Observer perspective, 
on the other hand, utilises a top-down approach to infer meaning from incorporating 
the wider context of the situation, such as the motivations behind behaviour, the 
consequences of action, and thus why the action was carried out. This classification 
of events based on level of meaning is known as action identification theory (Vallacher 
& Wegner, 1987); a hierarchically organised cognitive framework for defining event 
meaning, ranging from low-level (concrete) to high-level (abstract) construal’s. The 
significance of this lies with the notion that visual perspective corresponds to the 
identification of the remembered event, and thus on a psychological level, it 
determines the meaning of the event itself in the present (Asch, 1940, Schaeffer, 
2009).        
Furthermore, the ways in which things are recalled in the present have also been 
explored in the growing body of research assessing the role of visual perspective in 
self-evaluative processes. As discussed earlier, retrieved visual perspective is 
hypothesised to act as a mechanism to maintain a coherent sense of self over time 
and promote wellbeing (Bluck, 2003), and does so by influencing a number of internal 
assessments with reference to one’s current self-concept. A primary focus in the 
literature has therefore been the level of congruency between the remembered event 
and current views of the self. The subsequent findings (Sutin & Robins, 2008, Libby & 
Eibach, 2002, Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005) posit that memories for events that are 
incongruent with the current self-concept will be retrieved using an observer 
perspective in order to distance oneself from the past and reduce feelings of 
inauthenticity. However, memories for events that are congruent with the current self 
are remembered using an own-eyes perspective in order to focus on similarities 
between the past and present selves and enhance feelings of authenticity. A further 
theory is that the motivation to disown or claim the past event also influences the 
perspective used at retrieval (Sanitioso, 2008), such as adopting an own-eyes 
perspective when recalling a memory with desirable self-attributes with the aim to 
boost one’s current sense of self and verify self-beliefs (Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 
2003). In this respect, visual perspective acts as a distancing mechanism, whereby 
negative or damaging experiences are recalled from an observer perspective, thus the 
memory has reduced interoceptive awareness and becomes less relevant to the 
present self (Sutin & Robins, 2008), whereas positive experiences are recalled from 
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an own-eyes perspective to have the opposite effect (see also Construal Level Theory, 
Trope & Liberman, 2003).   
The impact of these processes on present self-evaluation is important to understand 
because of the resultant effect they have on an individual’s current mental state. 
Previous research has shown that mental disorders utilise visual imagery differently 
compared with normal controls (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). For example, post-
traumatic-stress disorder (PTSD) is characterised by highly vivid and emotional 
intrusive memories related to a previous trauma (Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996), 
and individuals with social anxiety commonly report experiencing self-focused 
negative imagery of poor social outcomes from an observer perspective (Hirsch, 
Meynen, & Clark, 2004). Notably, some mental disorders have been found to influence 
the overall prevalence of observer or own-eyes visual perspective in autobiographical 
memory. Depressed individuals, for example, have been shown to preferentially 
retrieve memories from an observer perspective (Kuyken & Howell, 2007), regardless 
of the memory age or content. Likewise, depressed individuals exhibit a reduction in 
own-eyes perspectives specifically for positive memories (Bergouignan et al, 2007), 
compared to normal controls that recall positive experiences from an own-eyes 
perspective to minimise psychological distance. Furthermore, research has revealed 
a role of overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM) in depressed individuals. 
Williams and Broadbent (1986) first described this phenomenon as the tendency to 
recall less specific and/or more general past events, and subsequent study has 
confirmed that increased OGM is a characteristic of depression (Williams et al, 2007). 
Thus, a common method used in life review therapy promotes the retrieval of specific 
events in order to reduce the associated depressive symptomatology (Serrano, 
Latorre, Gatz, & Montanes, 2004). Importantly, these findings indicate an impairment 
of autobiographical memory retrieval in depression, with observer visual perspective 
acting as a focal point for overgeneralisation of memory, reduced interoceptive 
awareness, negative self-evaluation, and the distancing of oneself from positive past 
experiences in the maintenance of the disorder (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009).  
The role of action identification with these personal-past related depressive 
symptomatologies, however, remains unclear. In healthy individuals, it is hypothesised 
that cognitive processing is continuously adapted via action identification, whereby the 
level of abstraction shifts in response to specific circumstances such as current mood 
state (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Research into this has revealed that happy moods 
result in more abstract processing, whereas sad moods result in more concrete 
processing (Beukeboom & Semin, 2005). In depressed individuals, however, this 
relationship appears to be dysfunctional, with individuals exhibiting highly abstract 
processing, despite their negative affect (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009). Perhaps the 
inability to regulate and adapt the level of action identification to suit the current needs 
of the individual is responsible for this abstract processing with negative mood 
(Watkins, 2008). Due to the functional equivalence of action identification with visual 
perspective (Libby et al, 2009), one can extend this finding to infer that impairment in 
visual perspective and related processes could be an underlying depressive 
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psychopathology (Watkins, 2011). Research into other defining characteristics of 
depression provide further support for this theory. The feeling of hopelessness is 
thought to derive from an impairment in prospection resulting in a negative view of the 
future (Roepke & Seligman, 2016). Recent evidence suggests that envisioning the 
past, hence adopting a visual perspective to retrieve the past, and imaging the future 
utilise the same core brain network within the medial prefrontal and medial temporal 
structures (Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008). The significance of this stems from 
the idea that depression is a consequence of impairment to this core brain network 
(Williams et al, 1996).   
The present study aims to investigate the individual differences within action 
identification and depression and their relationship with visual perspective in 
autobiographical memory, with the hope that this may aid in the understanding of 
possible mechanisms and the impact of depression on every day memory functioning. 
This study therefore has a number of hypotheses. Firstly, based on Kuyken and Howell 
(2007), and Libby et al (2009), individuals that score highly on the depression and/or 
behaviour identification scales will report a greater proportion of naturally occurring 
observer visual perspectives. Secondly, due to the similarity between action 
identification and visual perspective, and the finding that depressed individuals exhibit 
a deficit in the ability to flexibly shift their level of identification to match current 
situational demands (Watkins, 2008), it is hypothesised that higher levels of 
depression will correlate with an increased difficulty in shifting visual perspective.  
Lastly, the relationship between depression and visual perspective vantage point will 
be mediated by action identification level, as depressed individuals think more 
abstractly (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009). 
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Methods1 
Participants  
One-hundred-and-eighteen participants at the University of Sussex, aged between 18 
and 34 (M = 21.25 years, SD = 2.07 years), consented to the study. Of these, 40 were 
male, 77 were female, and one not recorded. Seventeen participants did not go on to 
the second part of the study due to having low own eyes and observer visual 
perspective ratings for all memories, therefore their data will be included for analyses 
involving part one and part three only. Two participants did not complete either the first 
and second, or the third part(s) of the study respectively and so were excluded from 
analysis due to incomplete data sets. One-hundred-and-sixteen participants (40 
males, 76 females, M = 21.23 years, SD = 2.07 years) were therefore included for 
analysis involving part 1 and part 3, and 99 participants (34 males, 65 females, M = 
21.25 years, SD = 2.16 years) were included for analysis involving parts 1, 2, and 3.  
Participants were recruited using email advertisements to psychology students 
enrolled at the University of Sussex, as well as poster advertisements placed around 
the campus. Further participants consisted of an opportunistic sample obtained by the 
experimenters. The only requirement for participation in the study was age above 18 
years due to the exploratory nature of the experiment. Ethical issues concerning the 
study related to the possibility of inducing emotional distress (see appendix A for a 
review of these issues). Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the 
University of Sussex Psychology Research Ethics Committee.   
Materials  
The ten cues for typical events in part one of the study were made up of slight 
adaptations from the events used in Nigro and Neisser’s (1983) seminal study, which 
have also been previously employed by both Rice and Rubin (2011) and McDermott, 
Wooldridge, Rice, Berg, and Szpunar (2016).   
Seven standardised questionnaires were distributed to participants during the third 
part of the study. These consisted of the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire 
(VVIQ, Marks, 1973), which examines the clarity of one’s mental imagery. Additionally, 
the Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire (OSIQ, Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 
2006) that aims to examine one’s object and spatial mental representations 
respectively. Thirdly, the Behaviour Identification Form (BIF, Vallacher & Wegner, 
1989), whereby everyday behaviours must be identified using abstract or concrete 
descriptions. A Perspective Taking and Spatial Orientation Test (PTSOT) developed 
by Hegarty and Waller (2004) was also used in order to test participant’s mental 
rotation and spatial perspective abilities.  
                                                          
1 Note: methods describe the entire experiment performed, with the inclusion of 
variables that are not discussed as the primary focus of this paper.   
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Mental health factors were measured using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, 
Spielberger & Gorsuch, 1983), the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale 
(CES-D, Radloff, 1977), and finally the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Checklist for 
DSM-IV criteria (PCL-C, Weathers, Huska, & Keane, 1991). These standardised 
questionnaires aimed to screen for symptomatology associated with anxiety, 
depression, and PTSD.     
Design  
A within-subjects design was used for part two of the study whereby four visual 
perspective shifting conditions were used per participant for each of the four selected 
memories. Maintain OE condition involved maintaining an own eyes perspective, the 
Shifted OE condition involved shifting from an own-eyes to an observer perspective, 
the Maintain OB condition involved maintaining an observer perspective, and lastly, 
the Shifted OB condition involved shifting from an observer to an own eyes 
perspective. A questionnaire design was used for the remaining parts of the study.   
Procedure  
Upon entering the experimental cubicle each participant read through an information 
sheet and signed a consent form (see appendix B). The experimenter then 
administered the instructions (see appendix C) whereby definitions for key phrases 
were provided. Visual perspective was defined as the vantage point through which a 
memory is seen in the mind’s eye, and it was highlighted that most memories are 
remembered in one of two ways; either the same way as encoding and therefore 
through one’s own eyes, or through an observer viewpoint whereby one can see 
themselves in the memory. Vividness was described as the clarity of mental imagery 
depicting a memory, and emotional intensity was defined as the strength of the 
emotion associated with a memory, regardless of whether the emotion is positive or 
negative.  
In the first part of the study, using the computer program MATLAB, participants were 
asked to retrieve and type a brief title for 10 specific autobiographical memories from 
the past three years, using the 10 cues for typical events in order to aid this process 
(see appendix D). Each time a memory was retrieved and titled the participant was 
asked to rate it on visual perspective, emotional intensity, and vividness using a visual 
analogue scale ranging from ‘low’ to ‘high’ (see appendix C for an example). 
Responses to these scales were recorded by the program to the nearest 0.25 within 
a maximum range of 0-100. Additional data regarding the origin of each visual 
perspective was recorded by selecting one option from a predetermined set of 
responses for each of the following three dimensions: height, location, and distance 
(see appendix C for an example).   
The two memories most strongly associated with each of the visual perspectives were 
then selected by the program for use in the second part of the study. In order for a 
memory to be selected, the corresponding visual perspective ratings had to be above 
60 for one perspective and below 50 for the other, with a larger difference between 
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these two ratings indicating a stronger association with the higher scoring perspective. 
Participants were asked to either maintain or shift their visual perspective for each of 
the selected memories. Specifically, for the two memories most strongly associated 
with an own eyes perspective, participants were asked to either maintain an own eyes 
perspective (Maintain OE) or shift to an observer perspective (Shifted OE).  Similarly, 
for the two memories most strongly associated with an observer perspective, 
participants were asked to either maintain an observer perspective (Maintain OB) or 
shift to an own eyes perspective (Shifted OB). The order with which participants 
completed the conditions was randomised each time to avoid order effects in the 
results. Participants then had to rate each memory on difficulty, perspective 
maintenance, the number of perspective shifts during retrieval, strength of own-eyes 
and observer perspectives, vividness, and emotional intensity, using the same visual 
analogue scales from part one. Similarly, the origin for each of the four memories was 
categorised based on height, location, and distance, as was recorded in part one.  
The final part of the study involved participants completing six standardised 
questionnaires (VVIQ, OSIQ, BIF, STAI, CES-D, and PTSD respectively) on an excel 
file followed by demographic information (see appendix E). Lastly, participants were 
given five minutes to complete the PTSOT using the computer program Anaconda 
(see appendix F). Participants were then fully debriefed by the experimenter at the 
end of the study, and were provided with a debriefing sheet (see appendix G).   
Results 
Preliminary Analysis  
Depression scores were calculated for each participant by summating the responses 
to the CES-D questionnaire and subtracting 20 from the total2. Action identification 
scores were calculated as the total number of higher-level alternative answers 
recorded in the BIF. Separate visual perspective scores were measured as 
participant’s mean rating for own-eyes and observer perspectives across all ten 
memories from part one of the experiment. The average observer ratings were then 
subtracted from the average own-eyes ratings to give a single naturally occurring 
visual perspective score for each participant (cf Rice & Rubin, 2009). A score of zero 
indicates equal strength for both perspectives, whereas more positive scores indicate 
a stronger own-eyes perspective and more negative scores indicate a stronger 
observer perspective. Difficulty shifting was measured as the total summated difficulty 
ratings from the Shifted OE and OB conditions, whereby higher scores represent 
increased difficulty in changing visual perspective. Maintain OE and OB difficulty 
ratings were not included as they involved maintaining, rather than shifting, the original 
perspective.  
                                                          
2 Note. one depression score was removed from the data set due to incorrect 
completion of the questionnaire by the participant resulting in a score of 72 out of a 
maximum 60. 
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Prior to the main analysis, a number of precautionary tests were carried out. Firstly, 
each data set was checked for normality by looking at skew and kurtosis values. By 
converting these to Z-scores, it was revealed that scores for depression (p < .001) and 
total shifting difficulty (p < .05) were significantly skewed. Upon inspection of visual 
plots, there appeared to be some additional issues with normality for the remaining 
variables. In order to objectively correct for this, original scores for all variables were 
converted to Z-scores to identify outliers and reduce bias. Using the rule denoting 95% 
of standardised residuals within each sample to fall within ±1.96, 99% of cases to fall 
with ±2.58, and 99.9% to fall within ±3.29, outliers were identified and the most 
extreme cases were winsorized by rearranging the z-score equation and replacing 
them with a score ±1SD from the mean. This aims to reduce the number of cases 
violating the rule to an acceptable amount subject to each sample size. Winsorizing, 
rather than trimming the data, was used in order to maintain the original trend and 
prevent the removal of data that is representative of individual differences in the 
sample.  
Firstly, three depression scores were winsorized, leaving five cases exceeding ±1.96, 
only one of which exceeded ±2.58. Secondly, four BIF scores were winsorized to leave 
five remaining cases outside ±1.96. Visual perspective scores were more problematic, 
with 13 scores needing winsorizing before violations were reduced to five (p < .05). 
Lastly, six difficulty scores were winsorized in order to reduce the number of violations 
to four (p < .05). Skew and kurtosis values were then recalculated and only the 
depression variable remained skewed (p < .05). In order to correct for this, the 
depression scores were transformed using a log transformation and the subsequent 
skew statistic was non-significant. A correlation was run between the transformed and 
non-transformed scores and they were found to be significantly correlated (r = .980, p 
< .001), therefore the log transformed depression scores will be used in further 
analysis unless stated otherwise. 
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Analysis 
 
Figure 1: The Relationship between Depression with both Visual Perspective 
and Shifting Difficulty Scores 
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Figure 2: The Relationship between Behaviour Identification and Visual 
Perspective 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the relationships between the predictor variables of action 
identification and depression with the outcome variable scores for visual perspective 
and/or shifting difficulty. In order to determine the significance of these relationships, 
both depression and action identification were correlated with the outcome variable 
scores of visual perspective and shifting difficulty. The results of this are summarised 
in Table 1. Although non-significant, the slightly negative relationship between 
depression and visual perspective was in the predicted direction, with higher levels of 
depression being associated with weaker own-eyes perspectives, tending towards 
stronger observer perspectives. The hypothesis that individuals who think more 
abstractly would also exhibit stronger observer perspectives was not supported, with 
a non-significant positive relationship reflecting increased strength of own-eyes 
perspective with more abstract identifications. Additionally, the correlation between 
depression and shifting difficulty was extremely low (r = -.010, p = .921), reflecting a 
lack of relationship between the two variables and thus failing to support the 
hypothesis that depressed individuals would find it more difficult to shift visual 
perspective. 
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Table 1: Intercorrelations, Means, and Standard Deviations3 of Behaviour 
Identification, Depression, Visual Perspective, and Shifting Difficulty Scores 
 
 1 2 3 4 M SD N 
1. Action 
Identification  
 
- .123 .036 .113 12.31 4.82 116 
2. Depression 
 
p = .190 - -.107 -.010 21.88 7.39 115 
3. Visual 
Perspective 
 
p = .705 p = .257 - -.111 9.31 25.87 116 
4. Shifting Difficulty 
 
p = .264 p = .921 p = .272 - 70.79 45.80 99 
 
Prior to running a mediation analysis, a number of assumptions were first checked. 
Using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) criteria for mediator variables, [bidirectional] causality 
between predictor variables and the outcome were assumed based on previous 
research (action identification and visual perspective: Libby, Shaeffer, & Eibach, 2009, 
depression and visual perspective: Kuyken & Howell, 2007), in addition to linearity, 
homogeneity of variance, and normality that were already corrected for in the 
preliminary analysis.  
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Note: mean and standard deviation values for depression were taken from the data 
prior to log transformation.  
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Figure 3: Model of Depression as a predictor of Visual Perspective, mediated by 
Action Identification. The bootstrapped confidence interval for the indirect effect 
is based on 1000 samples.  
 
In order to examine the relationships among depression, level of action identification, 
and visual perspective scores, a regression-based path analysis was performed. This 
analysis aimed to estimate the indirect effect in a mediation model using Hayes (2017) 
PROCESS command as implemented in SPSS v. 24. The model will therefore 
examine evidence that the strength of the relationship between depression and visual 
perspective of autobiographical memory can be explained through the indirect effect 
of the mediator (action identification). Figure 3 depicts a diagram of the mediation 
model. Analysis of results show a non-significant indirect effect of depression on 
naturally occurring visual perspective through action identification, b = 0.99, 95% BCa 
CI [-3.87, 6.73], with a corresponding small effect size, b = 0.006, 95% BCa CI [-0.02, 
0.04]. However, the total effect of depression on visual perspective when action 
identification is not included in the model remains non-significant, b = -18.18, t = -1.14, 
p = .257. Overall, the predicted mediation of the relationship between depression and 
naturally occurring visual perspective by action identification was not supported by the 
results.  
Discussion 
The aim of the study was to investigate the individual differences within action 
identification, depression, and their relationship with visual perspective in 
autobiographical memory. Analysis of the data failed to reveal any significant findings 
and thus did not support the hypotheses of this experiment or previous findings in this 
area. There are a number of possible reasons for obtaining these results as opposed 
Depression (CES-D) Visual Perspective (OE-OB) 
Action Identification (BIF) 
b = 3.93, p = .190 b = 0.25, p = .619 
Direct Effect, b = -19.17, p = .237 
Indirect Effect, b = 0.99, 95% BCa CI [-3.87, 6.73] 
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to those expected. The following discussion aims to evaluate the obtained results in 
more depth with these alternative explanations.  
Firstly, it was predicted that individuals with higher scores on the CES-D would retrieve 
memories with a stronger observer perspective compared to an own-eyes perspective. 
While a slight correlation was observed in this predicted direction, further analysis 
proved the relationship to be non-significant. Had this finding been significant, it would 
have supported previous literature and extend the current understanding of depressive 
pathology. This is because an increase in observer memories (strength and 
occurrence) correlates with reduced vividness and emotional intensity (Eich et al, 
2009), which may be a precursor for OGM (Willimas & Broadbent, 1986). One could 
link this to identity processing, whereby depressed individuals define themselves 
based on negative experiences that have been generalised across all domains of the 
self (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009), or possibly even that the negative affect arises because 
they struggle to define their sense of self at all from these psychologically distanced, 
vague, and unemotional episodes (Sutin & Robins, 2008). Furthermore, an increase 
in observer perspective is associated with abstract cognitive processing (Libby et al, 
2009), which in turn enables the individual access to information beyond the specific 
event and thus enables further evaluation of the self, intentions, and outcomes (Libby 
& Eibach, 2011). This may explain the rumination characteristic of depression, 
whereby individuals are constantly thinking about why past events have occurred and 
why they feel so negative (Watkins, 2011). While this explains the direction of the 
relationship between visual perspective and depression, however, it does not explain 
the lack of significance or the higher prevalence of own-eyes memories in general.   
A number of variables may have resulted in a reduction of naturally occurring observer 
visual perspective overall (or an increase in own-eyes), despite the varying scores for 
depression. First and foremost, participants were instructed to recall memories from 
the last three years. Numerous researchers have concluded that remote memories 
are more likely associated with an observer perspective, and recent memories are 
more likely associated with an own-eyes perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). While 
this instruction was put in place to prevent participants predominantly retrieving older 
events using an observer perspective such as childhood memories, it may have had 
the opposite effect. Further to this point is that the study took place on a university 
campus. As the sample consisted of university students, the vast majority of which (if 
not all) will have regularly attended the campus in question, being in that particular 
environment will have cued participants to retrieve specific events associated with the 
university. This idea is in line with encoding specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 
1973) with reference to extrinsic context (Godden & Baddeley, 1980), and can be 
described as the spontaneous intrinsic activation of an autobiographical memory in 
response to a set of (or one specific) cue(s) (Bernsten, Staugaard, & Sorensen, 2013). 
This was originally demonstrated by Godden and Baddeley (1975) through the 
enhanced retrieval of information that was learned and recalled in the same 
environment (underwater) as opposed to different environments (learning underwater 
and recalling on land). The relevance of this is that events cued by (and hence 
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associated with) the university environment are more likely to have happened recently 
(<3 years), and thus are more likely to be retrieved using an own-eyes rather than 
observer perspective.  
Similarly, it must be taken into consideration the effect of imagining, rather than 
remembering, specific episodes of the past. Autobiographical memory processes are 
both conscious and unconscious, and employ the same neural network involved in 
prospection, daydreaming, sleeping, and imagination (Schacter, Chamberlain, 
Gaesser, & Gerlach, 2012). Modern views of memory state that memories are 
constructions rather than reconstructions, and that all of these constructions involve 
false experience to some degree (Conway & Loveday, 2015). Recalling a specific 
episode, therefore, may unconsciously involve imagining certain aspects, especially if 
the individual is being suggested to retrieve an episode of a precise and constrained 
nature (Weingardt, Loftus, & Lindsay, 1995), as is in this study. Imagining events, such 
as future episodes, has previously been found to utilise more own-eyes visual 
perspectives, due to the reliance on readily available information based on recent past 
events (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). The interchangeable nature of 
memory and imagination is therefore important in terms of this study because 
participants may be unknowingly imagining certain aspects of “giving an individual 
public presentation” or “running from a threatening situation” and thus are more likely 
to adopt an own-eyes visual perspective for the task. Further to this, participants may 
also be influenced by social factors such as the perceived ‘normal’ perspective, and 
therefore may report a particular perspective as dominant based on cultural and 
societal norms (Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001). Future research could therefore 
look into the social and cultural influence as well as the difference between 
spontaneous and instructed visual perspective with regards to the suggestibility of 
memory.  
The second hypothesis of the study concerned action identification. Specifically, it was 
expected that more abstract thinking individuals would report stronger observer 
perspectives. Again, this was not the case, with a non-significant relationship in the 
opposite direction being found. Considering individuals tend to use a more abstract 
level of identification in general (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), this result is surprising. 
A possible reason for this is that participant’s scores on the BIF were not reflecting 
their level of action identification used when retrieving the memories previously. This 
is because it has been found that language has the ability to influence a person’s level 
of cognitive processing (Stapel & Semin, 2007). Specifically, the present study was 
focused on how a specific event was remembered, such as the emotional intensity 
and vividness, as opposed to why the event occurred. Thinking about the specific 
details and feelings of an event as it is experienced in the mind’s eye, without thinking 
about the general context of the situation or the motivations and consequences of 
actions, has been shown in the past to prompt more concrete levels of processing and 
a shift away from ruminative thinking (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). This suggests that 
even participants high in depression and abstract thinking may have reported more 
own-eyes perspectives due to the design of the experiment.  
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Additionally, it has been theorised that difficult tasks initiate concrete levels of 
processing in order to focus on the ‘here and now’ and enhance problem-solving 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). By not focusing on the information beyond that of the 
remembered episode such as context, it is easier to recall simple identities such as 
the vividness of the imagery being experienced. Perhaps participants adopted an own-
eyes visual perspective and concrete level of identification during retrieval in order to 
complete the task at hand in the most cognitively efficient way. It would perhaps be 
interesting for future studies to look at different levels of cognitive load while retrieving 
and shifting between perspectives during the task. It must be noted, however, that if 
the nature of the study (difficulty of the task, language used, and the type of information 
being focused on during retrieval) predisposed participants to utilise concrete levels of 
identification, then one would expect to find an increased proportion of concrete scores 
on the BIF. Still, one could argue that the situational demands of the experiment were 
slightly altered between retrieving the memories in part one and completing the BIF in 
part three. Therefore, while participants were influenced to think concretely and recall 
specific events from an own-eyes perspective in part one, the BIF in part three was 
measuring participant’s general level of identification and was not influenced by the 
current experimental design. Nonetheless, this suggests that action identification is 
perhaps more easily influenced and adapted than previously thought.     
The third hypothesis predicted that depressed individuals would find it more difficult to 
shift from one visual perspective to the other, however the results showed that 
depression and shifting difficulty did not affect one another. Firstly, it is possible that 
the design of the study induced concrete thinking (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) and 
thus own-eyes perspectives, as discussed above. If this was the case, then depressed 
individuals with a natural tendency to think more abstractly may find it less difficult to 
shift from an observer to an own-eyes perspective than non-depressed, less abstract 
thinking individuals shifting from an own-eyes to an observer perspective. This 
combined with the original hypothesis that depressed individuals find it difficult to shift 
perspective in general due to an impairment in the core brain network mediating 
memory retrieval, picturing the future, and imagination, would perhaps result in 
competing trends that appear to cancel each other out. Another explanation for the 
lack of correlation again draws on the design of the experiment. The original 
hypothesis was based on theories stating that depressed individuals fail to regulate 
the level of action identification by being unable to shift it to suit the changing 
circumstances (including mood) as is typically seen in healthy controls (Watkins, 2008, 
Forgas, 2008). While this may be true in real life events, the situational circumstances 
were not being manipulated during memory retrieval in the current experiment and 
therefore the increased difficulty in regulating the level of action identification and 
shifting visual perspective may not have been present. The ecological validity of the 
experiment is therefore questionable and the results may not be representative of real-
life events (Brunswik, 1947), hence further research should focus on naturalistic 
situations and avoid laboratory environments.    
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Lastly, it was hypothesised that the relationship between depression and visual 
perspective would be mediated by action identification. Libby et al (2009) first 
theorised that visual perspective of retrieved memory is functionally equivalent to the 
level of action identification and cognitive processing defining the particular episode. 
Therefore as depressed individuals have been observed to exhibit highly abstract 
cognitive processing (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009), it is expected that they would also 
retrieve the majority of memories from an observer visual perspective, as has been 
demonstrated in the past (Kuyken & Howell, 2007, Bergouignan et al, 2007). For the 
reasons discussed previously, however, this may not have been the case in the 
present study due to methodological influence, and thus the BIF and reported visual 
perspective were representing functionally different processes. This idea is supported 
by the data in the lack of correlation between depression and action identification 
scores. An important factor to take into account, however, is the semantic confusion 
between visual perspective definitions. What is meant by this is that people may be 
seeing themselves in the memory through their own eyes, and are thus both the 
observer and the observed (see Christian, Miles, Parkinson, & Macrae, 2013). If this 
were the case, it poses many implications for research in this field in that there may 
be critical differences between the observer-as-the-self perspective and the observer-
as-an-other perspective, such as the intensity of interoceptive awareness and self-
evaluative processing that may have previously been overlooked. It would be 
interesting to look at the differences between these versions of an observer 
perspective in terms of depressive symptomatology and action identification, for 
example does the observer-as-the-self perspective fall above or below the observer-
as-an-other perspective in the cognitive hierarchy.  
To summarise, the present study fails to infer any meaningful results concerning the 
relationships between action identification, depression, and visual perspective in 
autobiographical memory. It does however, highlight the importance of future literature 
to explore and control for the numerous confounding variables that have internal and 
external influence on autobiographical memory retrieval. The impact of depression on 
everyday memory functioning needs further exploring in order to develop the 
necessary treatments to combat symptomatologies such as ruminative thinking and 
hopelessness. Research should therefore target visual perspective related to negative 
affect specifically, and consider the role of continuous dynamic adaptations in action 
identification both during and outside experimental situations.   
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